privately on september 14, that there appeared to be a terrorist element to it but that it appeared first to be spontaneous but it became a terrorist attack, and that that was his belief. so were they not speaking basically in the same way? >> well, first of all, why are we doing the investigation? i think that's important. so our job as chairman of the intelligence committee is make sure we did not have an intelligence failure. was there an intelligence failure on that day? that's the first question we have to get right. and i'll tell you, i am with a high degree of confidence today will tell you that there was not an intelligence failure. the intelligence community had it right, and had it right early. what happened was it worked its way up through the system of the so-called talking points, which everyone refers to, and then it went up to what's called a deputy's committee. what i found fascinating about this investigation, and, again, my role here in my mind is to say, was there an intelligence failure, and if so, how to prevent it from happening again. it went to the deputy's committee, populated by appointees from the administration.